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Abstract
The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsis-
tency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market
power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the mag-
nitude of congestion tolls. When large agents are confronted with tolls derived under this
parametric assumption but understand the rule used to generate them, the toll system will no
longer guide the market to the social optimum. To address this problem, the present paper
derives alternate, manipulable toll rules, which are designed to achieve the social optimum
when agents anticipate the full impact of their actions on toll liabilities.
Manipulable Congestion Tolls
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Erik T. Verhoef*
Pigouvian taxes are standard instruments for dealing with negative externalities. The
problem, of course, is that the activity generating the negative external effect occurs at too
high a level. The Pigouvian tax is designed to raise the price for the activity, reducing its
overall level to one that is socially optimal. To compute the tax, the marginal externality
damage from the activity is evaluated at the social optimum, with the tax on each unit of the
activity then set at the resulting value. Faced with the tax, the offending agents restrict their
individual activity levels, leading to an optimal overall level. An alternative to this “classical”
Pigouvian approach, which is useful when the regulator knows the damage function but lacks
all the information needed to compute the optimum, is to charge a toll equal to marginal
damage evaluated at the expected equilibrium activity level. In equilibrium, this expectation
is confirmed, and the socially optimal activity level again emerges.
In a typical application, the marginal externality damage is itself a function of the overall
activity level, usually an increasing one. However, the computed tax is just a scalar value,
generated by evaluating the marginal damage function at the socially optimal activity level
(or the expected equilibrium level, under the alternate approach). Thus, while the Pigouvian
tax rule involves the level of the activity, the per-unit tax ultimately charged is just a number
generated by evaluating the rule at particular value.
The Pigouvian approach assumes that agents treat the resulting tax as parametric, inde-
pendent of their chosen activity levels. This view is appropriate when the externality is jointly
generated by many agents, each of whom makes a small contribution to the overall level of the
offending activity. However, when the externality is generated by just a few large agents, a
parametric view of the Pigouvian tax may be less plausible.
To understand this point, imagine that the socially optimal activity level varies from period
to period as a result of changes in the economy’s parameters (shifts in demand or cost curves,
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for example). Then, if the marginal damage function is increasing, the Pigouvian tax will
vary as well, exhibiting positive correlation with both the overall activity level and individual
activity levels within the small set of agents. This correlation may reveal to the agents the
nature of the rule used to compute the Pigouvian tax, showing that the tax per unit depends
on the overall activity level. Another reason why agents could be aware of the rule underlying
the calculation of Pigouvian taxes is that the principles according to which the tax level is
determined may have to be made transparent and publicly accessible for legal reasons. Agents
can then observe the rule directly. In either case, with this knowledge, agents may then attempt
to manipulate the tax regime, further restricting their activity levels in order to depress the
magnitude of the per-unit tax that they pay. Such behavior, which is shown below to be
relevant under the alternate, non-classical approach, undermines the Pigouvian tax regime,
making it incapable of achieving the optimum.
The purpose of the present paper is to explore an alternative approach to corrective tax-
ation that recognizes the potential existence of such manipulative behavior. Our approach
confronts manipulation head-on by replacing the conventional Pigouvian tax, designed to be
treated parametrically by individuals, with a tax rule that is designed to be manipulated. In
other words, the planner announces a rule that gives each agent’s tax liability as a function of
his or her own activity level and the levels of other agents. Each agent then optimizes with full
knowledge of the rule used to compute the tax liability, with the optimization being carried
out conditional on the choices of other agents. Thus, instead of using a Pigouvian rule that
operates behind the scenes to generate a tax value meant to be viewed as parametric, our
approach presents a transparent, manipulable rule that is directly exploited by the agents in
choosing their activity levels. The goal of the analysis is to derive the form of such manipulable
tax rules, providing a comparison to the Pigouvian case.
The analysis focuses on congestion externalities, where Pigouvian taxes take the form of
congestion tolls. Traditional analyses of road congestion pricing (see Small and Verhoef (2007))
are mostly immune to the manipulation critique from above, a consequence of the fact that
road users are typically atomistic and thus unable to manipulate Pigouvian congestion tolls.
However, a recent literature focuses on a case where the agents generating congestion are non-
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atomistic, raising concerns about manipulation. This is the case of airport congestion, which
arises from usage of a capacity-constrained airport by a relatively small number of airlines,
some of which may account for an appreciable share of the total flights. For concreteness, the
paper’s analysis is developed in the airport context.
Departing from previous studies, a recent literature on airport congestion recognizes the
non-atomistic nature of airlines while exploring a particular consequence of this alteration of the
standard road-oriented model: internalization of congestion. Internalization occurs because a
non-atomistic carrier, in scheduling an extra flight, takes into account the additional congestion
costs imposed on the other flights it operates. As a result, a Pigouvian congestion toll need
only charge an airline for the congestion imposed on other carriers, excluding the congestion
the airline imposes on itself. One implication of this rule is that, when carriers are asymmetric,
they should pay different tolls. A carrier with a large flight share should pay a low toll given
that it internalizes most of the congestion from its operation of an extra flight, while a small
carrier, which internalizes little of the congestion it creates, should pay a high toll. Using a
simulation model, Daniel (2005) was the first to recognize the potential for internalization of
congestion, while Brueckner (2002, 2005) and Pels and Verhoef (2004) explored the implications
of internalization using simple analytical models. A burgeoning literature has followed these
initial studies.1
As this discussion indicates, the recent analysis of airport congestion presumes the use
of Pigouvian congestion tolls, even though the non-atomistic nature of airlines suggests the
potential for manipulation of such tolls. The present paper is meant to redress this omission.
By analyzing the nature of the manipulable congestion tolls in an airport context, it adds a
missing component to the new theory of congestion pricing in the presence of non-atomistic
agents. The results, however, apply more generally to the theory of corrective taxation, showing
that manipulable taxes may need to replace Pigouvian charges in other contexts.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which takes the simplest
possible form. Two airlines serve a single travel market, with a congested airport at one
endpoint. While the general model has an elastic demand for travel and cost functions that
potentially differ across carriers, section 3 begins the discussion by considering a base case where
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demand is perfectly elastic and costs are symmetric. Section 3.1 derives the social optimum for
this case, and then computes the Pigouvian congestion tolls required to support it, assuming
that the tolls are viewed as parametric by the carriers. Then, section 3.2 explores the incentives
for toll manipulation, relying on the non-classical version of the Pigouvian approach sketched
above. Manipulable tolls, required in response to manipulative behavior, are analyzed next.
The analysis in section 3.3 derives the most general form for such tolls, and section 3.4 considers
their form under a plausible restriction, which requires a carrier’s toll liability to equal its own
flight volume times a toll per flight that is common across carriers. Section 3.5 considers the
issue of airport cost recovery under the different toll regimes. Section 4 focuses on the general
model, in which carriers are asymmetric and demand is no longer perfectly elastic, leading to
inefficient pricing mark-ups as carriers exercise market power. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively
consider general and restricted toll schedules for the general case, with the latter involving a
common toll per flight across the now-asymmetric carriers. Section 5 considers application of
the lessons of the analysis to other externality contexts, and section 6 offers conclusions.
2. The Model
The analysis focuses on a single travel market with a congested airport at one endpoint.
In contrast to some earlier papers, the model does not distinguish between peak and off-peak
periods, so that congestion is always present. The market is served by two airlines, denoted
1 and 2, which interact in Cournot fashion. Let fi denote the number of flights operated by
carrier i, and let the number of passengers per flight be constant and normalized to unity, so
that f1 + f2 represents both the total flight volume and the total number of passengers.
The demand for flights is given by the inverse demand function D(f1 + f2), which gives
the marginal willingness to pay for travel. Passenger volume is determined by equating this
willingness to pay to the “full price” of travel, which includes the airfare and the value of
lost passenger time due to airport congestion. With congestion depending on total flights at
the airport, time cost per passenger is given by h(f1 + f2), a function that is assumed to
be increasing and convex over the relevant range of flight volumes (it may be zero at low
volumes). Since the airfare plus time cost equals the full price, it follows that the fare is
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given by D(f1 + f2)−h(f1+ f2). Thus, congestion generates a fare discount, as verified in the
empirical study of Forbes (2008). Carrier i’s revenue is then equal to [D(f1+f2)−h(f1+f2)]fi,
i = 1, 2.
In addition to raising passenger time costs, airport congestion increases airline operating
costs, with the effect allowed to differ across carriers. Congestion cost per flight for carrier i is
given by gi(f1 + f2), i = 1, 2, with these functions again assumed to be increasing and convex
over the relevant range. An airline also incurs operating costs that are unrelated to airport
congestion, costs that again may differ across carriers. Assuming constant returns, these costs
are given by τifi, where τi is operating cost per flight, i = 1, 2.
Combining the above elements, airline i’s profit is given by
pii = [D(f1 + f2)− h(f1 + f2)]fi − τifi − gi(f1 + f2)fi
= D(f1 + f2)fi − τifi − ci(f1 + f2)fi, i = 1, 2 (1)
where ci(f1 + f2) ≡ h(f1 + f2) + gi(f1 + f2) gives passenger plus airline congestion cost.
Note that the two types of congestion costs enter the profit function symmetrically because
an increase in passenger time costs implies an equally large decrease in the fare that can be
charged for a given output level. Firm profits are therefore equally sensitive to h(f1 + f2) and
gi(f1+ f2). Social welfare is measured by total profit, pi1+pi2, plus consumer surplus, which is
given by
∫ f1+f2
0 D(x)dx− (f1+f2)D(f1+f2). Use of this welfare function requires the absence
of income effects on demand, in which case consumer surplus is an exact measure.
3. Base Case: Symmetric Carriers and Perfectly Elastic Demand
It is useful to begin by considering a base case where further simplifications are imposed on
the model. Accordingly, suppose that demand is perfectly elastic, so that the D function from
above is equal to a constant, denoted p. In addition, let costs be symmetric across carriers,
so that operating and congestion costs in (1) lose their i subscripts. After deriving results for
this base case, the analysis returns to the general case in section 4.
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3.1. Social optimum, laissez-faire equilibrium, and Pigouvian tolls
With perfectly elastic demand, consumer surplus is zero and social welfare equals total
profit, given by [p− τ − c(f1 + f2)](f1 + f2). Maximizing this expression by choice of f1 and
f2 yields two identical first-order conditions, given by
p − τ − c(f1 + f2) − (f1 + f2)c
′(f1 + f2) = 0. (2)
This condition determines a symmetric optimal flight volume, given by f1 = f2 = f
∗. Note
that (2) says that extra flights should be operated up to the point where the full price minus
operating and congestion costs per flight equals the marginal congestion damage generated
by an extra flight, given by (f1 + f2)c
′(f1 + f2) ≡ MCD. This expression equals marginal
congestion cost per flight, given by the slope of the congestion cost function, times the number
of flights experiencing the additional congestion.
The laissez-faire equilibrium is generated by profit maximization under Cournot behavior.
Carrier i’s profit equals [p− τ − c(f1 + f2)]fi, and the first-order condition for maximization
of this expression is
p − τ − c(f1 + f2) − fic
′(f1 + f2) = 0, i = 1, 2. (3)
In (3), fi rather than f1+f2 multiplies c
′, indicating that carrier i does not take into account the
congestion damage imposed on the other carrier when it schedules an extra flight. Therefore,
the symmetric equilibrium flight volumes, equal to f̂ , are too large, satisfying f̂ > f∗. Note
that, even though it ignores the impact on the other carrier, carrier i does internalize the
congestion it imposes on itself, viewing its own congestion damage (fic
′) as part of the cost of
operating an extra flight.
A Pigouvian toll, if viewed as parametric by the carriers, can remedy this inefficiency. The
toll charges each carrier for the congestion damage that it does not take into account, equaling
f−ic
′(f1 + f2) per flight for carrier i, where −i denotes the other carrier. Evaluating this
expression at the symmetric social optimum, the classical Pigouvian toll is then given by3
z = f∗c ′(2f∗). (4)
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When zfi is subtracted from carrier i’s profit, the new first-order conditions are
p − τ − c(f1 + f2) − fic
′(f1 + f2) − f
∗c ′(2f∗) = 0, i = 1, 2. (5)
which yield the solution f1 = f2 = f
∗.
In the road context, where internalization of congestion does not occur, the Pigouvian toll
would equal the full marginal congestion damage evaluated at the social optimum, given here
by MCD∗ = 2f∗c ′. But internalization means that a toll this large is not required, with z
instead equal to MCD∗/2.
3.2. Incentives for manipulation
While the “classical” Pigouvian approach embodied in (4) assumes that the regulator has
sufficient information to compute the optimum, an actual application of the Pigouvian method
might be based on incomplete information. The regulator, for example, may lack information
on the cost parameter τ or the full price p. Assuming, however, that the regulator knows the
congestion cost function c(·), a variant of the classical approach can be envisioned. It generates
the same optimal outcome as the classical approach when carriers treat tolls as parametric,
but the approach also invites toll manipulation.
Under this alternate approach, the regulator computes the congestion toll per flight using
the Pigouvian rule f−ic
′(f1 + f2). Rather than evaluating the rule at the social optimum,
which the regulator is unable to compute, the rule is evaluated at the flight volumes the reg-
ulator expects to emerge in equilibrium. These expectations must be confirmed, however, by
carrier choices. Given their perception of the toll (as parametric or, alternatively, subject to
manipulation), the flight-volume choices of the carriers must match the regulator’s expecta-
tions regarding these volumes. If not, the regulator would adjust the parametric tolls until
expectations are confirmed (achieving equilibrium).
In the case where the carriers view the toll as parametric, this equilibrium requirement is
straightforward. In particular, the Pigouvian toll per flight f−ic
′(f1 + f2), which is viewed as
parametric, is substituted in place of f∗c ′(2f∗) in (5). Evaluating the Pigouvian rule at the
flight volumes that satisfy (5) yields a toll that, when perceived as parametric by the carriers,
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elicits these same flight volumes as choices. Thus, the regulator’s expectations in computing
the toll are confirmed. Since the modified version of (5) coincides with the optimality condition
(2), the resulting equilibrium is efficient, just like the one based on the classical Pigouvian toll.4
Now consider the case where the airlines know the toll rule, perhaps because the parametric
toll has been adjusted a number of times in response to changes in the equilibrium (due to
variation in p or τ , for example) or because the toll rule is public. In addition, suppose that
the carriers use this knowledge to their advantage. Specifically, carrier i would view profit as
being given by
(p− τ )fi − c(f1 + f2)fi − f−ic
′(f1 + f2)fi, (6)
but the toll per flight expression (f−ic
′(f1 + f2)) appearing the last term would no longer
be viewed as parametric. Carriers would then optimize taking account of the effect of their
decisions on the toll paid per flight. Computing the relevant first-order condition and evaluating
at the symmetric equilibrium, the resulting common flight volume, denoted f˜ , satisfies
p − τ − c(2f˜) − 2f˜ c ′(2f˜ ) − f˜2c ′′(2f˜ ) = 0. (7)
Note that confirmation of the regulator’s flight-volume expectations is again ensured by (7).
The regulator expects symmetric flight volumes of f˜ and thus charges a toll per flight of
f˜ c ′(2f˜ ). But (7) ensures that carrier choices, which now involve manipulation of the toll,
generate a common flight volume of f˜ , confirming these expectations. The key observation
from (7), however, is that since c ′′ > 0, the equation is satisfied at an f˜ value smaller than f∗.
Thus, manipulation of the (non-classical) Pigouvian congestion toll leads to an inefficiently
low flight volume.5
3.3. A manipulable congestion toll
To circumvent manipulative behavior, the planner could abandon the Pigouvian toll and
instead announce to the carriers a complete rule that determines their toll liabilities as a
function of flight volumes. This toll rule is designed to be manipulated in the sense that
carriers are given full information about the connection between toll liabilities and their flight-
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volume choices, which can be exploited in decision making. Although the toll rule is given for
the carrier, the toll level has thus, intentionally, become “manipulable.”
Let Ti(f1, f2) denote the manipulable toll rule for carrier i, which gives its total toll lia-
bility as a function of both flight volumes (carrier i’s toll per flight, ti, is therefore equal to
Ti(f1, f2)/fi). Faced with this function, carrier i’s first-order condition for choice of fi is
p − τ − c(f1 + f2) − fic
′(f1 + f2) −
∂Ti(f1, f2)
∂fi
= 0, i = 1, 2. (8)
The goal is to choose the Ti functions so that the solutions to the two conditions in (8) coincide
with the social optimum. This goal can be achieved if the manipulable toll rule is chosen so
that (8) is the same as the social optimality condition in (2). Inspection of the two conditions
shows that this coincidence requires
∂Ti(f1, f2)
∂fi
= f−ic
′(f1 + f2). (9)
The left-hand side of (9) gives the marginal toll as perceived by a toll-manipulating carrier:
the additional toll liability resulting from adding an extra flight. Note that the right-hand
side of (9), when evaluated at the social optimum, is simply equal to the level of the classical
Pigouvian toll z, which itself represents a marginal toll given the toll liability of zfi. Thus,
(9) implies that the marginal toll from the manipulable case (when evaluated at the social
optimum) is equal to the marginal Pigouvian toll. Despite this coincidence of marginal tolls
in the two cases, it will become clear below that the average tolls (z in the classical Pigouvian
case vs. Ti(f1, f2)/fi in the manipulable case) will not be equal, nor will the total toll liabilities.
Integrating both sides of (9) with respect to fi directly yields the manipulable toll rule,
which is given by
Ti(f1, f2) = f−ic(f1 + f2) + Ki. (10)
where Ki is a constant of integration. Thus T1(f1, f2) = f2c(f1 + f2) +K1 and T2(f1, f2) =
f1c(f1+f2)+K2, so that a carrier’s toll liability equals the other carrier’s total congestion cost
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plus a constant. While Ki could be set at a fixed numerical value, it need only be independent
of fi and thus could be a function of f−i, the other carrier’s flight volume. Given this possibility,
a natural choice is to set Ki = −f−ic(f−i), so that
Ti(f1, f2) = f−ic(f1 + f2) − f−ic(f−i). (11)
Then, carrier i’s manipulable toll is zero when fi = 0 and equals the increase in the other
carrier’s congestion cost due to the flights operated by carrier i.
It is interesting to compare the toll liabilities in the manipulable and Pigouvian cases.
When the manipulable toll takes the form in (11), the toll liability can be rewritten as∫ fi
0 f−ic
′(x + f−i)dx, while under Pigouvian tolling it equals fif−ic
′(fi + f−i), with both
expressions evaluated at the social optimum to generate equilibrium values. If c(·) is strictly
convex, the second expression is larger for any values of fi and f−i, implying that the toll
liability under Pigouvian tolling exceeds that under manipulable tolling. However, given the
freedom to adjust Ki, a different choice can make the manipulable toll’s liability exceed that
of the Pigouvian toll.
3.4. A restricted manipulable toll
The manipulable toll in (10) has a form that might be viewed as unappealing in a practical
sense, given that it embodies a charge that depends on the other carrier’s congestion cost.
To eliminate this drawback, a different toll rule can be derived, subject to a more natural
restriction on the rule’s form. In particular, suppose that a carrier’s toll liability is required
to equal its own flight volume times a function, common to both carriers, that depends on
the total flight volume at the airport. Stated differently, the requirement is that the average
toll paid by a carrier, equal to its toll liability divided by its own flight volume, be given by a
common function that depends on the flight total. Letting this average toll function be written
t(f1 + f2), carrier i’s toll liability is then given by fit(f1 + f2). Thus, the restriction implies
T1(f1, f2) ≡ f1t(f1 + f2) and T2(f1, f2) ≡ f2t(f1 + f2).
Under this restriction, ∂Ti(f1, f2)/∂fi = t(f1+f2)+fit
′(f1+f2) holds, so that (9) becomes
t(f1 + f2) + fit
′(f1 + f2) = f−ic
′(f1 + f2). (12)
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But recognizing that the flight volumes are symmetric in equilibrium, f1 = f2 =
F
2 holds,
where F is the total flight volume. Making this substitution, (12) can be rewritten as
t(F ) +
F
2
t′(F ) =
F
2
c ′(F ). (13)
This condition is a linear, first-order differential equation in the unknown function t(F ).
Given the presence of the 1/2 factor, the left-hand side expression cannot be integrated, ap-
parently preventing derivation of a general solution. However, a solution can be derived under
a fairly general functional form for c(·). In particular, if c(F ) ≡ αF θ, where θ ≥ 1, then a t(F )
function with the same exponent but a different multiplicative factor can satisfy (13). Letting
t(F ) = βF θ, (13) reduces, after differentiation and substitution, to the following requirement:
βF θ +
F
2
βθF θ−1 =
F
2
αθF θ−1, (14)
which is satisfied when β = αθ/(2 + θ). Thus, the manipulable average toll function for this
special case is given by
t(F ) =
αθ
2 + θ
F θ (15)
When carrier i faces a toll liability of fit(f1 + f2) = fi
αθ
(2+θ)
(f1 + f2)
θ, the resulting profit-
maximizing flight volumes are socially optimal.
The equilibrium toll payment under this restricted manipulable function is smaller than
in the Pigouvian case. Under the assumed form of c(·), the marginal Pigouvian toll per flight
(either in the classical case or the non-classical equilibrium) is (F ∗/2)c ′(F ∗) = (αθ/2)F ∗ θ,
which exceeds the average manipulable toll in equilibrium, given by (15) evaluated at F ∗ (the
socially optimal total flight volume). This relationship also holds in general, as can be seen
from inspection of (13). Since the right-hand side evaluated at F ∗ is the Pigouvian toll per
flight, it follows that t(F ∗) must be smaller than this magnitude as long as t′(·) is positive.
Intuitively, the average manipulable toll is less than the Pigouvian toll when the average toll is
increasing since this effect provides an additional deterrent in limiting a carrier’s flight volume.
11
3.5. Airport cost recovery
The well-known self-financing theorem from road pricing theory says that, when roads are
built with neutral scale economies and an additional zero-degree homogeneity assumption holds
for the congestion function (i.e., a doubling of traffic flow and capacity would leave the travel
time constant), the cost of the optimal-size road is exactly covered by Pigouvian congestion
toll revenue (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962). This result fails to hold, however, in the airport
context due to internalization of congestion, which generates smaller tolls than in the road
setting (for a formal derivation, see Brueckner (2002, 2008)).
Given the conclusions derived above, the revenue shortfall is even larger under a restricted
manipulable toll rule. In other words, since the average manipulable toll is smaller than the
Pigouvian toll in equilibrium, and since the latter toll itself already fails to cover airport cost, a
larger deficit emerges in the manipulable case. Since the general manipulable toll also generates
a smaller liability than the Pigouvian toll when it takes the form in (11) and c(·) is convex,
cost recovery again fails in this case. The deficit under both types of manipulable tolls must
be covered by additional lump-sum charges.
4. The General Model: Asymmetric Carriers and Imperfectly Elastic De-
mand
4.1. The unrestricted manipulable toll
Consider now the more general case where carriers need not be symmetric and demand is
not necessarily perfectly elastic. Social surplus is now defined by
W =
∫ f1+f2
0
D(x)dx −
2∑
j=1
fj(τj + cj(f1 + f2)), (16)
and the social optimum requires
D(f1 + f2) − τi − ci(f1 + f2) − fici
′(f1 + f2) − f−ic−i
′(f1 + f2) = 0, i = 1, 2, (17)
where the subscript −i on c(·) denotes the function belonging to carrier i’s competitor. Note
that (17) differs from (2) in the lack of symmetry and the appearance of D(·) in place of p.
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Using (1), the first-order condition for profit maximization in the absence of tolls is
D(f1 + f2) + fiD
′(f1 + f2) − τi − ci(f1 + f2) − fici
′(f1 + f2) = 0, i = 1, 2. (18)
Note that the second term in (18) arises from the exploitation of market power, which allows
the carriers to raise the fare by limiting flights. When a classical Pigouvian toll is used to
eliminate the difference between (17) and (18), carrier i’s toll equals
zi = f
∗
i D
′(f∗1 + f
∗
2 ) + f
∗
−ic−i
′(f∗1 + f
∗
2 ), (19)
as seen in Pels and Verhoef (2004). The asterisks again denote socially optimal values, which
are now asymmetric, as are the Pigouvian tolls themselves. Note that the first term in (19) is
negative when demand is imperfectly elastic, indicating that the toll is adjusted downward to
mitigate over-pricing by the carriers. This correction vanishes as carriers become infinitesimally
small and fi approaches zero. The downward adjustment of Pigouvian taxes under market
power was originally derived by Buchanan (1969), and it further erodes the scope for self-
financing of optimal airport capacity. Observe that the market-power adjustment in (19) is
larger for bigger carriers, offsetting their greater incentive to restrict output in order to raise
the fare.
As before, the manipulable toll rule Ti(f1, f2) for carrier i should be set so that the marginal
toll coincides with the Pigouvian toll rule. Using (19), this requirement yields
∂Ti(f1, f2)
∂fi
= fiD
′(f1 + f2) + f−ic−i
′(f1 + f2), i = 1, 2. (20)
The manipulable toll rule is found by integrating (20), which yields
Ti(f1, f2) =
∫ fi
0
xD ′(x+ f−i)dx + f−ic−i(f1 + f2) + Ki, i = 1, 2. (21)
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Integrating the first terms by parts and imposing the previous requirementKi = −f−ic−i(f−i)
on the constants of integration, (21) reduces to
Ti(f1, f2) = −
[∫ fi
0
D(x+ f−i)dx− fiD(f1 + f2)
]
+ f−i(c−i(f1 + f2) − c−i(f−i)), i = 1, 2.
(22)
Note that (22) equals the increase in the other carrier’s congestion cost due to carrier i’s
operations minus the addition to consumer surplus from these operations. With toll liability
rule (22) in place, airline i’s profit function becomes effectively equal to social surplus above
the level achieved if only f−i were supplied. This fact can be verified by substitution of (22)
into the expression giving profit net of the toll and comparing with (16). The intuition is
simple: if a toll manipulator is to be seduced to behave so as to maximize social surplus, the
toll liability should be defined so that profit inclusive of this liability should vary perfectly in
parallel with social surplus. In hindsight, it would have been surprising if this would not have
been true.
The distributional impact of the toll schedule, rewarding the carrier with the full increase in
social surplus it creates given the competitor’s output, may of course be considered undesirable.
The Ki terms may then be used to adjust this impact by setting them at values different
from Ki = −f−ic−i(f−i). But what the analysis shows is that post-tax profits should vary
perfectly in parallel with social surplus for the manipulable toll to be optimal, a property that
is independent of the choice of Ki. This requirement leaves the Ki terms as instruments to
address distributional concerns.
As in the case of the Pigouvian toll from (20), the total toll liability in (22) may be positive
(a net tax) or negative (a net subsidy). The latter outcome emerges when consumer surplus
is large relative to the congestion externality (requiring sufficiently inelastic demand). This
ambiguity reflects the use of a single toll instrument to address two opposing distortions: a
market-power distortion that inefficiently limits flight volumes, and a congestion externality
that inefficiently inflates them. As suggested by Brueckner (2005), however, these two distor-
tions could be addressed by different instruments in a situation where the distortions can be
separated. Such a situation arises when the carriers serve multiple markets, with each provid-
14
ing service between a common set of n uncongested endpoints and the same congested airport
(which might be a hub). Since they involve different endpoint cities, such markets may have
different demand functions, leading to market-power distortions of different magnitudes. These
distortions can then be addressed by market-level subsidies, while congestion is addressed by
separate airport-level tolls, either of Pigouvian or manipulable form. With two asymmetric
carriers, the required subsidies would be both carrier and market-specific, yielding 2n different
subsidies in the various markets. In addition, two different, carrier-specific tolls would be levied
at the congested airport. The subsidies and tolls would separately represent the market-power
and congestion terms, suitably generalized to multiple markets, from either the Pigouvian toll
formula (20) or the manipulable formula (22).
A final point regarding the correction of the market-power distortion concerns first-degree
price discrimination. Under such behavior, every ticket would be sold at a price equal to
the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, and the market-power distortion would vanish.
Although price discrimination in fare setting is standard practice in the airline industry, it
does not take on this ideal form, so that some downward adjustment of congestion tolls (or the
payment of separate market-level subsidies) will remain necessary to compensate for excessive
fares.
4.2. Feasibility of a manipulable rule with a common average toll
As seen in section 3.2, a restricted manipulable toll, where both carriers are charged the
same average toll, is feasible in the basic model. A natural question is whether such a toll is
feasible in the general setting under consideration. One might expect that carrier asymmetry
makes a restricted toll like that derived above infeasible, and the ensuing analysis shows that
this conjecture is indeed correct. Even though this result may come as no surprise, the analysis
further illuminates the issues involved in deriving manipulable toll rules.
As before, when carriers pay a common average toll t(·), the marginal manipulable toll is
given by ∂Ti(f1, f2)/∂fi = t(f1+f2)+fit
′(f1+f2), so that the marginal-toll condition (20) must
hold with the latter expression replacing the left-hand side expression. In the previous analysis,
the analog to (20) (namely, eq. (10)) reduced to the single condition (11) given symmetry of
the carriers. However, with asymmetry, (20) remains as two separate equations involving the
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level and derivative of the desired average toll function t(·). These equations can be solved for
these unknown quantities, yielding
t(f1 + f2) =
f1
2
f1 − f2
c′1(f1, f2) −
f2
2
f1 − f2
c′2(f1, f2) (23)
t′(f1 + f2) = −
f1
f1 − f2
c′1(f1, f2) +
f2
f1 − f2
c′2(f1, f2) + D
′(f1, f2). (24)
Although a restricted toll function could be derived in the basic model by finding the
solution to a differential equation, a similar outcome is not feasible here. To see the difficulty,
observe that the left-hand of (24) is not equal to the derivative of left-hand side of (23), which
means that a function t(·) satisfying these two conditions for all values of f1 and f2 does not
exist. While this conclusion means that a restricted manipulable toll rule like that in section
3 is infeasible, it is possible to generate a “fake” manipulable rule, one that is computed using
knowledge of the social optimum. In this sense, the toll resembles the classical Pigouvian toll
in (19), whose computation requires all the information needed to derive the socially optimal
values f∗1 and f
∗
2 . In particular, it can be verified that the linear average toll function given by
t˜(f1 + f2) = δ + β(f1 + f2) (25)
yields a manipulable toll rule that generates the social optimum, where the slope and intercept
terms δ and β are derived using (23) and (24) and themselves depend on f∗1 and f
∗
2 .
6
A toll rule with a common average toll per flight may be appealing on equity grounds, but
despite the negative conclusion just derived, equity could be achieved in a different fashion.
Specifically, since the airport authority can adjust toll liabilities under the general manipulable
toll by varying theKi terms in (21), any distributional goal can be met even though the desired
type of restricted toll function is not available.
5. Manipulable Taxes in Other Contexts
The principles of the preceding analysis can be applied in other contexts where manip-
ulation of Pigouvian taxes may occur. Consider, for example, the pollution context, where
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two firms generate pollution as a by-product of production, with the externality damage a
function of the sum of these two levels (this damage is suffered by other agents, not the firms
themselves). A firm’s pollution level depends on its output along with the level of a costly
abatement activity, and the demand for each firm’s output is assumed to be perfectly elastic.7
In this case, the social optimum requires equality between the marginal profit from an
extra unit of output and the marginal pollution damage from that unit (equal to the additional
pollution times marginal pollution damage). In addition, the marginal benefit from abatement
(equal to abatement productivity times marginal pollution damage) must equal the marginal
abatement cost. Together, these two conditions determine the firms’ optimal output and
abatement levels. Provided that the firms view any pollution tax as parametric, the optimum
can be generated by a Pigouvian tax equal set equal to marginal pollution damage, evaluated at
the socially optimal pollution level under the classical approach or at the expected equilibrium
level under the alternate approach.
When firms manipulate the Pigouvian tax, the optimum fails to emerge, and a manipulable
tax is then required. The form of this tax can be predicted given the previous analysis. In
particular, each firm should pay a tax liability equal to total pollution damage, adjusted by
some constant. When such a tax, whose structure is understood by the firms, is subtracted
from profit, optimal output and abatement levels are then chosen. It should noted that, since
pollution damage is suffered by agents other than the firms themselves, the manipulable tax
structure does not share a key feature of the previous congestion tolls: charging for damage to
the other firm. Instead each firm is charged for damage done to (outside) pollution victims,
adjusted by constant. A manipulable tax would have a similar form in many other contexts.
6. Conclusion
The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable in-
consistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert
market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on
the magnitude of congestion tolls. When large agents are confronted with tolls derived under
this parametric assumption but understand the rule used to generate them, the toll system
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will no longer guide the market to the social optimum. To address this problem, the present
paper has derived alternative, manipulable toll rules, which are designed to achieve the social
optimum when agents anticipate the full impact of their actions on toll liabilities. The analysis
shows that, although the marginal tolls do not differ between the conventional Pigouvian and
manipulable cases, the average and total toll liabilities generally will be different. In addition,
revenues from manipulable tolling are lower than under parametric Pigouvian tolling, further
reducing the scope for self-financing of capacity. The approach used in the paper can be ex-
tended to derive manipulable Pigouvian taxes in other contexts where large agents generate
externalities and understand the impact of their actions on corrective tax liabilities.
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Footnotes
1See Brueckner (2008), Brueckner and Van Dender (2008), Verhoef (2008), Daniel and Pahwa
(2000), Daniel (2001), Daniel and Harback (2008a,b,c), Zhang and Zhang (2006), Basso and
Zhang (2007), Johnson and Savage (2006), and Morrison and Winston (2007).
2A related concern about manipulation arises in markets for pollution permits, where large
polluters could manipulate the permit price to their advantage. See Hahn (1984) for an early
study investigating this issue. Note that a similar phenomenon could emerge in the market
for airport slots, which represent an alternate instrument (analogous to pollution rights) for
dealing with airport congestion (see Brueckner (2008) and Verhoef (2008) for analyses of
slot markets).
3Note that the adjective “classical” is used to denote a parametric toll that is set under the
correct prediction of the optimum. The term is therefore not used to distinguish tolls with
and without partial internalization of congestion.
4It should be noted that a classical Pigouvian toll is not subject to the kind of manipulation
described in this section. Since a classical toll comes from evaluating the Pigouvian rule at
the social optimum, the only way carriers could affect the toll level is by somehow changing
the regulator’s perception of the optimum. Such behavior is conceivable, for example, in a
setting where the regulator relies on the carriers for information on the cost parameter τ , used
in computing f∗. Carriers could misrepresent their costs, thus influencing the regulator’s
computed f∗ and ultimately the level of the toll they pay. Exploration of such an alternative
setting, however, is beyond the scope of the paper.
5Note that the regulator’s expectations are also confirmed in the classical Pigouvian case.
The regulator uses the socially flight volume f∗ in computing the toll, and this flight volume
is indeed chosen by the carriers.
6In (25), β equals left-hand side of (24) evaluated at f∗1 and f
∗
2 , while δ equals the left-hand
side of (23) evaluated at the optimum minus β(f∗1 + f
∗
2 ).
7If the firms produce the same good, the common market demand is assumed to be perfectly
elastic.
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